The Inefficient Pair

A recurring divergent performance on an equity pair could redefine alpha.

Robert Arnott’s, Research Affiliates LLC, has received a patent for an indexing methodology that selects and weights securities using fundamental measures of company size, such as dividends and sales. Fundamental indexing has gained popularity with $27 billion tracking the indices. This is 3% of the total investments tracking the S&P 500. Apart from the fact that the patent gives intellectual rights to Research Affiliates and generates license fee for the company, the revolution here is challenging the benchmark.
We talked briefly about fundamental indexing in our last two features. Putting simply Arnott and his team at Research Affiliates suggest that active investing is a futile exercise and passive investing (indexing) is better, if done using fundamental indexing. The researchers have published many research papers and a book on the subject. In their book Robert Arnott, Jason C. Hsu and John M. West detail out how passive investing outperformed money managers over the long term. Since 1983 for example both average equity mutual fund and average equity mutual fund investor underperformed the S&P500 Index fund by more than 200 basis points.
Arnott makes a case against active management by saying “active managers cannot collectively outpace the indices, relative performance is a zero-sum game, any winners must have losers on the other side of their trades, and the quest for alpha is a zero sum game”. This the authors say happens because selling the most profitable investments run contrary to human nature and buying the bleakest underperformers is against our natural instincts. Neglecting this simple exercise is a source of negative alpha, especially when risk and mean reversion of market is taken into account.
Fundamental indexing assumptions rests on historical back testing which proves that negative alpha comes from first; overreliance on equity, second; ignoring rebalancing opportunities (courage to exit winners), and third; chasing winners (capitalization weighting portfolios). The second and third aspects are similar, but it’s the aspect regarding overreliance on equity that could be relooked at.
This first aspect suggests that failure to look at other assets to diversify will create negative alpha over the long term. This means that an investor can not have a pure equity based investment strategy to generate higher returns than the benchmark. Equity has one of widest range of offer. There is equity based on commodity, green assets, renewables etc. If we consider the broad economic cycles panning out multi years of low interest rates or multi years of higher interest rates, interest rate sensitive sector will diverge from interest insensitive sectors. We at Orpheus can illustrate more examples to challenge the idea that pure equity portfolio cannot itself offer internal diversification in a pure equity portfolio to outperform the benchmark. Times are always unprecedented and to accept that equity components as an asset class fall together and rise together could be challenged if one looks at the performance between sectors. If equity components rise together and fall together, there is no business of inter equity sector performance to diverge as much as 100% on an annualized basis. We carried a half year review on Indian markets (India outlook H209) where we illustrated cases with more than 100% annualized divergent performance between sectors. BSE REAL had outperformed BSE Sensex by 173% on an annualized basis from mar lows to 24 July. As anticipated the performance cycle reversed and BSE REAL underperformed BSE Sensex by 27% annualized since the 24 July case. This leads us to question the whole idea of risk premium. Do we really understand the idea of risk premium? Or the market did not know how to measure alpha in the first place? Now we have instruments which let us trade with a leverage of -1 on spot. Did anyone say it’s hard to find negative correlation? Modern finance has a solution.
Suddenly Arnott’s historical back testing on overreliance on equity reason seems challengeable. After the sectoral performance divergence if one can highlight cases of equity pairs built from DOW 30 components or BSE30 (India) components that not only show 100% divergence across recurring periods but also deliver more than what conventional wisdom might find coincidence, the overreliance on equity clause stands open to debate. We took this case in Grasim and Larsen and Toubro, two multibillion dollar blue chips from Indian equity universe. Performance pair cycles can isolate extreme divergences between highly correlated and similar sector peers too. Starting 24 Oct 08 – 24 Mar 09, a Long Grasim – Short L&T strategy returned 72%, while from 25 Mar to 1 July 09, the Short Grasim – Long L&T strategy returned 100%. This might look like a strange coincidence that if you buy one sector peer and sell the other one, the one you sell goes down, while the one you buy goes up. A similar divergence can be showed between Chevron – Exxon, Coca Cola -Kraft, GE-Caterpillar, Pfizer and JNJ and even between equity components and index. How can one explain this divergence? How would the market explain and measure this ability to isolate such performances on a regular basis?
Arnott, the behavioral school, Mandelbrot and many other luminaries don’t accept performance cyclicality as quantifiable across time frames. The idea of alpha or relative performance being a zero sum game is an illusion. If time is fractalled, alpha is infinite and unlike popular belief human greed and fear is finite. Cyclicality is at the heart of fundamental indexing and behavioral finance. Just because majority does not find alpha and only Johan Paulson gets it, does not make passive indexing better than active investing. Active investing like anything will fail if it does not understand time cyclicality, performance cyclicality. Active management is random and unpredictable if it does not comprehend the order of time cycles, time fractals or performance cycles.
Market, asset, performance was always relative. By diversifying in and out of equity Arnott is proposing to capture relative performance between assets contradicting himself by saying when it comes to pure equity it can’t be done. One cannot call the markets as inefficient on one side and tell the alpha seeker that he lives a dream. Everything in markets is a pair. Even if look at single assets, they are paired against a local currency. Fundamental Indexing vs. Mcap investing is relative performance. Arnott says that risk is symmetrical, why not cyclical Robert? The book also mentions that nearly all investment strategies have experienced certain cyclicality with periods of good and bad performance. Who says this performance cyclicality is not quantifiable? A similar question can even be put to Robert Shiller, Yale who illustrates a comprehensive case on how worst value performers in terms of P/E top the performance list a decade later.
I don’t know why only historical back test convinced Arnott that it was best avoiding the performance game. Fundamental index has many merits above traditional indexing, but it’s the way it is pitched against anything active is academically confrontational. The very idea that chasing performance only translates to incremental profits without netting for other costs assumes that all performance  chasing strategies are already understood and there is nothing left to understand regarding performance chasing.
In conclusion, if inter equity performance divergences are quantifiable and if they can be indexed, fundamental indexing stands challenged not only on its premise of futility of active investing but  also as the best available passive investing solution. This seems like a monumental obstacle for a simple inefficient equity pair.




ORPHEUS RESEARCH AT REUTERS – UNITED KINGDOM
ORPHEUS RESEARCH AT REUTERS – USA
Share